One month after the Lehman Brothers and AIG collapses I wrote the following on this blog [Is the current turmoil a boon for exchange traded credit derivatives? - Part V, Oct 17, 2008]: .....As I stressed a month ago (17/9 AIG+CDS=SOS) I thought the collapse of AIG would be the start.....of the new era where counterparty risk would take center stage......
Now, at least one highly influential academic, Francis Longstaff at UCLA, has studied whether this actually happened (an increased focus on counterparty risk correct). The answer is yes, at least if one believes Longstaff et al. in COUNTERPARTY CREDIT RISK AND THE CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP MARKET
The authors find clear evidence of the Lehman default (which occurred two days before the AIG collapse) changing the behavior of dealers towards counterparty risk. Two quotes from Longstaff et al. are
“Surprisingly, we find that there is little evidence that dealer credit risk was priced in the CDS market prior to the Lehman bankruptcy………. This result is consistent with market sources indicating that the Lehman default highlighted the importance of a number of counterparty credit risks that had previously been largely ignored”.
and
“How should these results be interpreted? One possibility is that prior to the Lehman bankruptcy, the market viewed the practice of collateralization as fully effective in mitigating counterparty credit risk. Subsequently, however, the market underwent a regime shift as it realized that no firm was too large to fail and that there were numerous legal pitfalls inherent in even a collateralized counterparty relationship.”
I think that is really good news, if true, and I think there will be more written on this issue in the academic community. I do not have access to the great data set that Longstaff et al. have but if I did I am sure I could come up with some really nice studies that could be done.